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Aging and Pensions in General Equilibrium: 
Labor Market Imperfections Matter
* 
 
This paper re-examines the effects of population aging and pension reforms in an OLG 
model with labor market frictions. The most important feature brought about by labor market 
frictions is the connection between the interest rate and the unemployment rate. Exogenous 
shocks (such as aging) leading to lower interest rates also imply lower equilibrium 
unemployment rates, because lower capital costs stimulate labor demand and induce firms to 
advertize more vacancies. These effects may be reinforced by increases in the participation 
rate of older workers, induced by the higher wage rates and the larger probability of finding a 
job. These results imply that neglecting labor market frictions and employment rate changes 
may seriously bias the evaluation of pension reforms when they have an impact on the 
equilibrium interest rate. 
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Declining fertility, increasing longevity, and the aging of the baby-boom generation will all con-
tribute to substantial increases of the old-age dependency ratio, especially in Western countries.
Most of the increase in the old-age dependency ratio is expected to take place between now and
2050. This has raised concern about the sustainability of existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public
pension schemes (see for instance Gruber and Wise (2004, 2005)) and has motivated pension
reform plans.
It is now well understood that a correct appraisal of population aging and pension reform eﬀects
calls for a general equilibrium approach. OLG models such as those developed by Auerbach
and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) (deterministic setting) and Ríos-Rull (1996) (stochastic set-up) provide a
useful analytical framework, exploited in many papers to obtain quantitative evaluations (see
for instance Börsch-Supan et al. (2002, 2006) and the series of papers presented at the Carnegie-
Rochester Conference (2007)). All these studies point out that population aging will make labor
relatively scarcer and change equilibrium factor prices. Wages are expected to rise and interest
rates to fall. Because aging is a worldwide but asynchronized phenomenon, savings rates are
expected to evolve diﬀerently in diﬀerent countries, leading to signiﬁcant international capital
ﬂows. Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) and Attanasio et al. (2007) both emphasized that a proper
evaluation of the impact of aging on equilibrium prices and quantities calls for a multi-country
approach. However, Attanasio et al. (2007) suggested that accounting for international capital
ﬂows might have little impact on the ﬁscal variables themselves, because of the counteracting
eﬀects of interest and wage rate changes (for instance, lower capital tax revenues compensated
for by higher labor tax revenues following an increase in payroll or consumption taxes).
Most existing models rely though on quite streamlined representations of the labor market and
assume perfect competition. The focus is on individual hours of work rather than employment.
In this context, considering endogenous rather than exogenous labor supply decisions barely
changes the estimated quantitative impact of population aging (see for instance Attanasio et al.
(2007), Krüger and Ludwig (2007)). As noted by Lucas (2007), neglecting labor adjustments
along the extensive margin may be quite misleading. Such adjustments can play a signiﬁcant
role, especially in countries (like many European ones) where labor market imperfections and
institutions can have a strong, age-speciﬁc impact on job creation and destruction.
The aim of this paper is to allow for such eﬀects and evaluate their quantitative contribution
to the macroeconomic eﬀects of population aging. To that end, we combine two strands of
research, life-cycle and search/matching models. Labor market imperfections are modeled as
in Pissarides (2000), with matching and wage bargaining. To concentrate on the extensive
margin eﬀects, we shut oﬀ the intensive margin channels by assuming that each worker supplies
inelastically one unit of labor. Changes in total hours of work are solely due to changes in the
2number of employed workers1. We furthermore allow for early-retirement eﬀects.
It is well documented that participation rates vary over the life-cycle. Participation rates of
middle-aged workers (25-55) are high and similar in both the US and the EU. The participation
rates of older (>55) workers are however lower in the EU. The literature stresses that diﬀerences
in older participation rates reﬂect cross-country diﬀerences in labor market frictions and in the
generosity of early-retirement provisions. Several empirical studies have shown that ﬁnancial
incentives do have a signiﬁcant impact on early-retirement decisions (see for instance Gruber and
Wise (1999) or Duval (2003) and the references therein). Although the oﬃcial retirement age is
exogenous in most countries, the actual average retirement age is endogenous and contributes
to explaining the lower employment rate of older workers. Like Heijdra and Romp (2007), we
thus distinguish the normal (compulsory) retirement age (65 years) and the early eligibility age
(55). Workers may choose to retire between 55 and 65, and receive then an early-retirement
compensation. Like Börsch-Supan et al. (2006), we consider a stylized two-tier pension system,
so that after 65 the revenue of pensioners is made up of two components, a public PAYG pension
and a private pre-funded pension (the revenue from accumulated savings).
A few studies have already examined some of the consequences of introducing life-cycle features
into frictional labor markets; none of them has however evaluated the eﬀects of population
aging. Hairault et al. (2010) examined early-retirement decisions and job search intensities
in a search model à la McCall (1970), with exogenous wage distribution extended to include
stochastic aging. The emphasis is on the relationship between the time to the retirement age
and the ﬁnancial incentives to invest in search activities. Chéron et al. (2008a,2008b) developed
this modeling strategy further. They introduced a matching process similar to that used by
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) adapted to include ﬁnite lifetimes. They showed that in some
circumstances (in particular at ﬁxed, age-independent worker productivity) the job destruction
rate is higher for older workers, because the time horizon relevant for the employment decision
decreases with age. In these models, there is no post-retirement consumption and no savings;
the interest rate is exogenous.
Our model has three main building blocks (i) demographics; (ii) labor market frictions and
institutions (including early-retirement provisions); (iii) life-cycle consumption and savings.
Ríos-Rull (2001) emphasized the importance of a careful description of the demographic process,
which can vary a lot from country to country. To ﬁt actual data, we use French mortality,
fertility and migration rates, so that the size of each cohort in every period coincides with the
most recent demographic projections. We assume no aggregate uncertainty. In line with most
of the literature, we also assume perfect risk sharing across individuals of a given generation,
1Börsch-Supan and Ludwig (2010) distinguish labor supply adjustments along both the extensive and the
intensive margins and discuss the connections/interactions between pension reforms and labor market reforms.
Changes along the extensive margin however remain exogenous to the model.
3so that individuals are perfectly insured against life and income uncertainty.2 There are no
intended bequests. All workers are perfect substitutes, although the worker’s productivity is
age-dependent. There is no age discrimination, so that ﬁrms posting a vacancy may end up
hiring a worker of any age category. We examine in this setup the eﬀects of population aging
and pension reforms on equilibrium unemployment and activity rates, and on the cost of public
PAYG pensions as a percentage of GDP. In order to focus on labor market imperfections and
their consequences, we do not at this stage build a multi-country model. We consider a single
country, and illustrate the potential impact of international capital ﬂows by comparing two
polar cases, the closed and the small open economy case.
We use numerical simulations to examine the properties of our model and the consequences
of aging and pension reforms. The most important feature brought about by labor market
frictions is the connection between the interest rate and the unemployment rate. Exogenous
shocks (like aging or pension reforms) leading to lower interest rates also imply lower equi-
librium unemployment rates. This is because lower capital costs stimulate labor demand and
induce ﬁrms to post more vacancies. The consequence is a higher employment rate and higher
bargained wages. When participation of older workers is endogenous, these employment eﬀects
are reinforced by the increased participation rate of older workers, induced both by the higher
wage rate and the larger probability of ﬁnding a job. It is shown in that context that neglecting
labor market frictions and employment rate changes may lead to the underestimation of pension
reform eﬀects when they aﬀect the equilibrium interest rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. The
calibration is detailed in Section 3. Simulation results are presented and discussed in Section
4. in Section 5 we present our conclusions.
2 The Model
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and frictions on
the labor market. Frictions are modeled following Diamond, Mortensen, and Pissarides (DMP),
with (exogenous) job destruction and a matching function. We assume perfect substitutability
between all workers, although labor productivity is age-dependent. Perfect substitutability
means that there is a single matching function (all vacancies can be ﬁlled by any worker,
whatever his or her age). Age-directed search is not a credible strategy in our setup. Because
the value of an unﬁlled vacancy is zero at equilibrium (free entry condition), a ﬁrm which
wanted to target at, say, young workers, would eventually hire the ﬁrst worker who applied,
2There are a few exceptions. Kruger and Ludwig (2007) and Hairault and Langot (2008), for instance,
investigated the consequences of policy reforms (increased taxes or lower beneﬁts) on inequality when ﬁnancial
markets are incomplete and individuals face idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
4provided the surplus to be shared was positive. Bargained wages will reﬂect diﬀerences in work
eﬃciency.
2.1 Demographics
We do not model education and human capital accumulation and focus on the behavior of
people between 25 and 104 (the maximum life duration). One period of time lasts ﬁve years.
Each member of a given generation can thus live for up to sixteen ﬁve-year periods (from age
25 till 104), indexed from 0 to 15. Let Za;t denote the size of the generation reaching age a at
period t. The size of new generations changes over time at an exogenous rate xt:
Z0;t = (1 + xt)Z0;t 1; 8t > 0; (1)
where xt includes both fertility and migration shocks at age zero. As in de la Croix et al.
(2007), we assume that migrants of each generation have the same characteristics as natives.
Abstracting from later migration shocks, the size of a given generation t declines determin-
istically through time. This size is determined by a cumulative survival probability a;t+a so
that:
Za;t+a = a;t+a Z0;t + Xa;t+a; 8a 2 f1;2;:::15g; (2)
where 0  a;t+a  1 is decreasing in a, with 0;t = 1. Migration ﬂows after age 25 are taken
into account through Xa;t+a. Total (adult) population at time t is equal to Zt =
P15
a=0 Za;t.
The demographic growth and survival probability vector can vary over time. These changes
are assumed to be exogenous.
We use the dummy variable za;t+a to deﬁne the population of working age:
Pa;t+a = za;t+a Za;t+a; (3)
where za;t+a = 1 for 0  a  7, za;t+a = 0 otherwise. We assume a mandatory retirement
age of 65, so that all people above 64 (8  a  15) are inactive. We further assume that the
participation rate between 25 and 54 is exogenous and normalized to unity. Between 55 and 64,
workers can choose to take early-retirement. People of working age are thus either employed
(N), unemployed (U), or on an early-retirement scheme (E). Thus:
Pa;t = Na;t + Ua;t + Ea;t ;
=
h
na;t + ua;t + ea;t
i
Pa;t ; 0  a  7
, 1 = na;t + ua;t + ea;t ; (4)
where lower-case n, u and e denote the proportion of individuals in each state. The early-
retirement rate before 55 is zero (ea;t = 0 for a < 6). Let 6;t denote the fraction of people who
5choose to retire early and leave the labor market at age a = 6 (between 55 and 60), so that the
number of early retired workers of that age group is E6;t = 6;t P6;t. Similarly, let 7;t denote
the fraction of active workers who decide to leave the labor market at age a = 7 (between 60
and 64). The total number of workers on early-retirement at time t is then equal to:
E6;t + E7;t = e6;t P6;t + e7;t P7;t ;
with e6;t = 6;t ; (5)
e7;t = 6;t 1 + 7;t (1   6;t 1):
2.2 Labor Market Flows
We assume a constant returns to scale matching function:
Mt = M(Vt;
t) (6)
where Vt and 
t stand respectively for the total number of vacancies and job seekers at the
beginning of period t. 










[1   (1   )na 1;t 1]Pa;t
+ [1   (1   )n5;t 1](1   6;t)P6;t
+ [(1   6;t 1)   (1   )n6;t 1] (1   7;t)P7;t:
(7)
At the beginning of period t, all new entrants P0;t are job seekers. Except for early-retirement
decisions, job separations are determined by an exogenous job destruction rate . Parameters
6;t and 7;t introduce the eﬀects of early-retirement.









The number of employed workers in age group a is determined by the sum of non-destroyed





for a = 0;




for 1  a  5;




for 6  a  7:
6After substituting for 
a;t, this equation becomes:
na;t = pt ; for a = 0;
= (1   pt)(1   )na 1;t 1 + pt for 1  a  5;
= (1   pt)(1   a;t)(1   )na 1;t 1 + pt(1   a;t) for a = 6;
= (1   pt)(1   a;t)(1   )na 1;t 1 + pt(1   a;t)(1   a 1;t 1) for a = 7:
(9)
The same equation can be written in terms of the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy qt by using
pt = qt Vt=




Na;t ; with Na;t = na;t Pa;t :
2.3 Households
It is assumed that each individual belongs to a representative household, one for each age
category. There is no aggregate uncertainty, and all households have perfect foresight. There
is perfect insurance against the adverse eﬀects of individual lifetime uncertainty. There are
no intended bequests. Participation rates of workers below 55 are assumed to be exogenous
and normalized to unity. The household’s decision variables are consumption, savings and
early-retirement rates, subject to the lifetime budget constraint.
Participation Decisions and early-retirement
Participation decisions have been investigated separately in the OLG and the search/matching
literature. Various contributions in the OLG literature have focused on the determinants of
the optimal retirement age. Hu (1979) assumed that agents live for two periods. The optimal
retirement age is determined by the optimal fraction of time devoted to leisure in the second
period of life. He examined the eﬀects of social security on capital accumulation and labor
supply in a PAYG case. The short-run eﬀects of pensions depended on the elasticities of demand
and supply of labor; long-run eﬀects were inﬂuenced by the elasticities of savings and bequests.
Michel and Pestieau (1999) modeled the labor participation choice in a similar fashion. The
fraction of time spent working in the second period declined when the size of the social security
payment increase. For the ﬁrst-best optimum (golden rule steady state) to be decentralized as
a competitive equilibrium, both PAYG social security tax and the retirement age must be set
optimally. De la Croix, Mahieu, and Rillaers (2004) also used a two-period lifetime setup to
analyze retirement decisions. They focused on optimal dynamic adjustments following a fertility
drop and showed that the optimal adjustment of the retirement age (the fraction of the second
period devoted to leisure) depends on preference and technology parameters. Boucekkine et al.
7(2002) and Heijdra and Romp (2009) have endogenous retirement in a continuous time OLG
model with ﬁnite lifetimes and indivisible labor (participation is either 1 or 0). Heijdra and
Romp (2009) focused on the eﬀects of demographic shocks and pension beneﬁts on individual
early-retirement decisions. Their results suggest that only drastic reforms have a signiﬁcant
impact on individual retirement decisions.
None of the previous papers takes into account labor market frictions. Most contributions
dealing with participation decisions in the search and friction literature have used models with-
out savings and capital accumulation. Recently though, Ravn (2008) has used a stochastic
growth model with inﬁnitely lived consumers to investigate the role of endogenous participa-
tion decision on the transmission of shocks at business cycle frequencies. Labor is indivisible;
individual workers are perfectly insured against idiosyncratic consumption risk, as in the lottery
model developed by Rogerson (1988). This leads to a utility function linear in the participa-
tion rate, which implies a strong relationship between consumption and labor market tightness,
the so-called consumption-tightness puzzle. Because of the linearity of the utility function,
participation rates react too strongly to labor market tightness, which makes unemployment
procyclical. To avoid this unrealistic implication, Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009) assumed
perfect risk sharing of both consumption and leisure. All consumers are part of a representa-
tive household and share their revenues. The household decides the per capita consumption
level and the participation rate. This in eﬀect amounts to assuming that labor is divisible,
with each individual choosing the fraction of time spent on the labor market (as employed or
unemployed). See Tripier (2003) for a similar approach.
Our model combines life-cycle features and labor market frictions. In order the avoid the
consumption-tightness puzzle, we shall rely on the Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009) speci-
ﬁcation and introduce it into our OLG structure. Without frictions, our speciﬁcation would be
similar to that used by Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) (i.e. in a perfect competition setup, with
elderly workers characterized by stronger leisure preferences and choosing a smaller working
time).
Optimization Program of the Representative Household





















8where  is a subjective discount factor3, a;t+a is a cumulative survival probability, za;t+a is the
working age dummy variable (za;t+a = 1 for 0  a  7, 0 otherwise), and Z0;t is the initial
size of the cohort. Instantaneous utility is assumed to be separable. The utility of per capita
consumption c is represented by a concave function U (we shall use a logarithmic function).
The marginal disutility of working is assumed to be constant4 and equal to dn. The extra utility
derived from early-retirement is represented by a concave function of the early-retirement rate
e (0 <  < 1). The decision variables are c, 6 and 7. These last two variables refer to the
fraction of agents in the corresponding age groups who decide to take early-retirement and leave
the labor market, at ages 55 and 60 respectively. Employment rates na;t+a and early-retirement
rates ea;t+a (and their the connection to the ’s) are given by Equations (5) and (9).




t+a)wa;t+a :na;t+a + b
u


















replacement beneﬁts received respectively by the unemployed worker, the early retiree and the
pensioner; sa;t+a is the ﬁnancial wealth accumulated at time t + a, in per capita terms. This
ﬁnancial wealth is held in the form of either shares or physical capital. Because there is perfect
insurance against individual lifetime uncertainty (as if there were a perfect annuity market), the
total return to savings is equal to the gross risk-free interest rate Rt+a divided by the survival
probability a;t=a 1;t 1.











After substitution and rearrangements, the condition determining the optimal proportion of


























where  is the unconditional probability of being employed (i.e., the probability that an active
worker chosen at random is actually employed). A similar condition holds for early-retirement
3As stressed by Ríos-Rull(2001),  can represent both pure time preference and the eﬀect of family size
changes (implying that consumption is enjoyed diﬀerently at diﬀerent ages).
4Our formulation normalizes the disutility of search activities of the unemployed to zero. Setting dn  0
amounts to assuming that the disutility of working can be larger than that of searching.
9at age 55 (see details in the appendix). Equation (12) says that the household’s optimal early-
retirement rate is such that the marginal utility of early-retirement (early-retirement income
plus leisure utility) is equal to the expected marginal utility of remaining active on the job
market (wage income net of labor disutility and unemployment beneﬁt, each weighted by their
respective probability). Which member of the household will actually take early-retirement
does not depend on the initial employment status. Both employed and unemployed workers
may become early retirees. This follows from our speciﬁcation of labor market ﬂows (Equation
(9)). Assuming that only previously unemployed workers can shift to early-retirement would
be much too restrictive and unrealistic. Firms do take advantage of the generosity of early-
retirement schemes to adjust the number of their employees, while elderly workers do agree to
quit jobs earlier if the early-retirement compensation is appropriate.









































where @na+j;t+j=@na;t can be obtained from Equation (9).
2.4 Firms
There are two productive factors, labor and capital. Labor is measured in eﬃciency units.
Eﬃciency may vary across age (because of experience) and across generations (because of





We assume a constant-return-to-scale production function in labor and capital:
Yt = At F(Kt;Ht); (14)
where At stands for total factor productivity. Firms rent capital at cost vt = Rt+ 1 and pay a
gross wage wa;t to workers of age a. We denote by  the employer wage tax. The representative
10ﬁrm maximizes the discounted value of all the dividends (proﬁts) that will be distributed to its
shareholders. Proﬁts at time t are given by:
t = F(Kt;Ht)   vt Kt  
7 X
a=0
(1 + t)wa;t Na;t   aVt (15)







F(Kt;Ht)   vt Kt  
7 X
a=0







subject to Equation (9) and pt = qt Vt=
t. The ﬁrst-order optimality conditions are















@Na;t is the value at time t of an additional worker of age a. With a job destruction rate

























where a+i;t+i  0 for a + i < 6.
2.5 Government
We assume that unemployment and (early or standard) retirement beneﬁts are determined by
an exogenous fraction of the relevant gross wage, so that
bu
a;t = u
t wa;t for 0  a  7;
be
a;t = e










for 8  a  15:
(20)
5Shareholders may belong to diﬀerent age groups and have diﬀerent consumption levels. Still, they all have









11The retirement beneﬁt is computed from the average wage during the last four periods. Total





















Public consumption is assumed to be a fraction of output, net of vacancy costs, i.e.
Gt =  g (Yt   aVt): (22)
We further assume that the “government” balances its budget in every (ﬁve-year) period by
adjusting consumption taxes (i.e., c
t is the adjusting variable):6

c








= Gt + Tt ; (23)
where aggregate consumption Ct =
P
a ca;t Za;t. For convenience, we assume no public debt.
Public debt could be introduced by postulating an exogenous path of the debt, and assuming
that the deﬁcit adjusts (via c) to match that path.
2.6 Wages


















t =@Na;t is given by Equation (13) and @W F
t =@Na;t by Equation (19).

















2.7 Capital Market Equilibrium
Let Qt denote the total ﬁnancial value of ﬁrms at time t. In our deterministic setup, the return
on equities must be equal to the market interest rate. In other words, the value of equities must
be such that, for all t  0:
Qt+1 + t+1
Qt
= Rt+1 : (26)
The left-hand side is the return of one unit of savings investment in equities while the right-hand
side is the return if invested in ﬁrms’ bonds.
6Changes in c
t aﬀect all incomes in the same way, while changes in w
t , for instance, would change net
replacement rates.
12Equilibrium on the capital market then implies that:
Kt+1 + Qt =
14 X
a=0
sa;t Za;t : (27)
2.8 Intertemporal General Equilibrium
We shall consider two versions of the model, one with frictions and the other with perfect
competition on the labor market. The two corresponding intertemporal general equilibria are
formally deﬁned In Deﬁnitions 1 and2 below.
Deﬁnition 1 Given the following exogenous processes and initial conditions:




– policy variables fu
t;e
t;i
tgt=0::+1 (replacement rates) and fw
t ;tgt=0::+1 (tax rates),








t=0::+1 and early-retirement decisions fea;t;a;tg
a=6;7
t=0::+1
maximize households’ utility (10) subject to budget constraint (11) and to (5);
2. capital input fKtgt=0::+1, posted vacancies fVtgt=0::+1 and output fYtgt=0::+1 maximize
ﬁrms’ proﬁts (16) subject to (8), (9), (14), and K0 =  K0;
3. the number of new hires fMtgt=0::+1, the probability of ﬁnding a job fptgt=0::+1 and of
ﬁlling a vacancy fqtgt=0::+1, and the employment rates fna;tga=0::7
t=0::+1 satisfy the matching
technology (6), (8) and (9);
4. total population and the population of working age fZa;t; Pa;tga=0::7
t=0::+1, and the number of
job seekers f
tgt=0::+1 satisfy the population dynamics (1), (2), (3) and (7);
5. unemployment fua;tga=0::7
t=0::+1 is such that the time constraint (4) holds;
6. wages fwa;tga=0::7
t=0::+1 are negotiated following the Nash bargaining rule (24);
7. government beneﬁts fbu
t be
t;bi
tgt=0::+1 follow the rules deﬁned by (20), and government
spending fGtgt=0::+1 follow (22);
138. consumption taxes fc
t gt=0::+1 are set by the government to balance its budget (23);
9. stock market prices and interest rate fQt;Rtgt=0::+1 satisfy the arbitrage condition (26)
and the ﬁnancial market clearing condition (27).
Deﬁnition 2 Given the same exogenous processes and initial conditions as in Deﬁnition 1, an




t=0::+1 and early-retirement decisions fea;t;a;tg
a=6;7
t=0::+1
maximize households’ utility (10) subject to budget constraint (11) and to (5);
2. capital input fKtgt=0::+1, posted vacancies fVtgt=0::+1 and output fYtgt=0::+1 maximize
ﬁrms’ proﬁts (16) subject to qt = 1, (9), (14), a = 0 and K0 =  K0;
3. the number of new hires fMtgt=0::+1 satisﬁes Mt = Vt, the probability of ﬁnding a job
fptgt=0::+1 and of ﬁlling a vacancy fqtgt=0::+1 satisfy qt = p1 = 1, and the employment
rates fna;tgt=0::+1;a=0::7 satisfy (9);
4. total population and the population of working age fZa;t;Pa;tga=0::7
t=0::+1, and the number of
job seekers f
tgt=0::+1 satisfy the population dynamics (1), (2), (3) and (7);
5. wages fwa;tga=0::7
t=0::+1 are such that na;t + ea;t = 1;
6. government beneﬁts fbu
t be
t;bi
tgt=0::+1 follow the rules deﬁned by (20);
7. consumption taxes fc
t gt=0::+1 are set by the government to balance its budget (23);
8. the interest rate fRtgt=0::+1 satisﬁes the ﬁnancial market clearing condition (27).
3 Calibration
Our objective is to reexamine the channels by which population aging aﬀects the economy
in an OLG setup with labor market frictions. More speciﬁcally we want to evaluate the role
of labor market imperfections and the interactions between pension reforms and the labor
market. Our calibration is meant to represent a European situation such as France with fairly
generous unemployment beneﬁts and public pensions, and substantial early-retirement beneﬁts
inducing low participation rates among elderly workers. The parameters of the model fall into
four categories: (i) general technological and preference parameters; (ii) parameters speciﬁc to
the frictional labor market; (iii) parameters determining taxes and transfers; (iv) parameters
determining demographic changes (fertility, mortality, migration).
14Technological and Preference Parameters
We assume a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function. The elasticity of
output with respect to capital is set at  = 0:33. In order to focus on the eﬀects of demographic
changes, we leave aside technological progress and assume constant values of the TFP and age-
speciﬁc human capital parameters (At and ha;t respectively). To reproduce the life cycle proﬁle
of wages, we assume that a worker’s productivity increases with age until 50, and then decreases,
but only very slowly so, as suggested by empirical ﬁndings. Bargained wages broadly follow
the same pattern, with a negative age eﬀect (due the shorter expected job duration of older
workers) on top of the productivity eﬀect.
We assume that the instantaneous utility is logarithmic in consumption, so that the wealth
and substitution eﬀects of a change in the interest rate cancel each other out. The subjective
rate of time preference is given the customary value of 1% per quarter. The depreciation rate
of capital is then set at 2.5% per quarter, so as to obtain a capital-output ratio equal to 2.50
on a yearly basis. There is no bequest motive. Given the assumed demographic structure (see
below), the resulting steady state real interest rate is 5.27% p.a. Individual consumption rises
over the life cycle and savings are negative during the ﬁrst two periods of life.
We set the labor disutility parameter dn at 0.25 (which, at the steady state consumption level,
represents about 15% of the wage income). The values of the two leisure (early-retirement)
parameters de
6 = 0:031 and de
7 = 0:049 are chosen to give early-retirement rates for workers
aged 50-59 and 60-64 respectively equal to 15% and 50% in the year 2000 (7.4% and 19% in
the ﬁnal steady state). Parameter  is set to 0.80, which implies a Frisch elasticity of around
0.6, in line with estimated values (see Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009))7.
Labor Market Parameters
The matching process is represented by a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function.
The elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies  and the bargaining power of workers  are
both ﬁxed at 0.50. The job separation rate  is set at 2% per quarter. The matching eﬃciency
parameter  and the vacancy cost a are chosen to be 0.90 and 43.5 respectively, so that the
steady state probabilities (over a ﬁve-year period) of ﬁnding a job p and of ﬁlling a vacancy q
are both equal to 90%. This value of the vacancy cost a represents 33% of the gross wage of
a 45-year-old worker. With these parameter values, the steady state unemployment rates are
10% for young workers (25-29), around 3.8% for mature adults (35-54), and around 3.3% for
workers of early-retirement age.




15Symbol Value Symbol Value
Production function
A 20.000  0.33
 (quarterly) 0.025
Age-dependent productivity
h0 2.70 h1 3.30
h2 3.85 h3 4.45
h4 5.00 h5 5.80
h6 5.60 h7 5.50
Preferences






 0.90  0.50
 (quarterly) 0.02 a 43.50
 0.50
Policy variables
 0.35 w 0.150
 g 0.20 u 0.400
e 0.50 i
t (year 2000) 0.550
i
t (year 2050) 0.35 i
t (year 2100) 0.325
Table 1: Parameter values
16Taxes and Transfers
Government consumption is a constant fraction of GDP ( g =20%). The gross replacement rate
for unemployed workers is ﬁxed at u = 0:40, implying a net replacement rate of about 47%.
Actual net replacement rates vary a lot across countries and unemployment durations. The
chosen value is close to the OECD median value for a two-year unemployment spell (see OECD
(2009), Table 1.6). The replacement rate for early-retirement is assumed to remain constant,
at e = 0:50. The reference wage used to compute pension beneﬁts is typically an average of
wages in the best years of activity. For simplicity, we deﬁne the reference wage as the average
wage of workers aged 45-64. At a given replacement rate, our formulation implies that pensions
are indexed on current wages (rather than prices). We calibrate the pension replacement rate
i
t on French data, as reported in EC (2009). The 2000 value is i = 0:55. The French pension
reforms of 1993 and 2003 are however expected to progressively decrease this replacement rate
through three main channels: (i) reference wage calculated over a longer period; (ii) indexation
to prices rather than wages; (iii) increase in the number of years of activity required to have
full pension rights8. The eﬀects of these reforms will appear progressively in future years and
should mean a 20 percentage points decrease in the value of the replacement rate by 2035 (30
percentage points by the year 2050). These changes are included in our base scenario (see Table
1).
Demographic Variables
Expected population growth rates vary across countries. We chose to calibrate the main de-
mographic variables on French data. Survival probabilities from 1900 till 2100 are taken from
Vallin and Meslé (2001). The expected decrease in mortality rates is illustrated in the left panel
of ﬁgure 1. These changes imply that life expectancies at birth would increase from 77.9 years in
2000 to 86.5 in 2050 and 90.8 in 2095. Fertility and migration shocks (variables xt and Xa;t+a)
are calibrated so as to reproduce the population changes (by age category) observed or expected
to take place from 1900 till 2100. The projections till 2050 are the latest ones published by
INSEE (see Robert-Bobée (2006), updated in April 2007)9. We assume that the population
stabilizes progressively after 2050. These projections are illustrated in the right panel of Figure
1. The reported population changes (total and adults over 24) imply a quasi-constant popu-
lation of age 25-64. The dependency ratio (deﬁned as the ratio between the population over
64 and that aged 25-64) increased around 10 percentage points between 1950 and 2000; it is
expected to double during the next sixty years, reaching 60% in 2060 and stabilizing at 69%
after 2100.
8See Bozio (2008) for an ex post evaluation of the eﬀects of this reform.
9Available at http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?ref_id=PROJPOPACT0650#a1
17Figure 1: Projected age-speciﬁc death rates (left), (adult) population growth and dependency
ratio (right)
Eigenvalues
Once the model has been calibrated, we can assess the convergence speed by computing the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system around the steady state. It is
generally found that such eigenvalues are complex numbers which generate non-monotonic
dynamics (see Azariadis, Bullard and Ohanian, 2004). Figure 2 represents the stable eigenvalues
of the two models. Considering only the largest eigenvalues, which are those that matter as far
as sluggishness is concerned, we observe that those of the model with frictions are larger, but
the diﬀerence is very small. We conclude from this that labor market frictions do not mean
more sluggishness compared to a Walrasian set-up, at least in an OLG model with ﬁve-year
periods.
4 Simulation Results
We ﬁrst present the simulation results obtained in the base scenario and illustrate the speciﬁc
impact of migration and fertility shocks. We then highlight the role of labor market imperfec-
tions by contrasting the results of the base scenario with those obtained under the assumption
of a competitive labor market. To illustrate the properties and quantitative implications of our
model, we next examine two hypothetical policy scenarios assumed to take place after 2000,
the elimination of early-retirement payments and the shift to a fully-funded pension scheme.
We ﬁnally discuss the sensitivity of our results, especially with respect to international capital
ﬂows.
18Figure 2: Eigenvalues of the model with (circles) and without (squares) frictions
4.1 Base Scenario
The base scenario incorporates the following exogenous shocks, described in the previous section:
(i) decreasing mortality rates; (ii) fertility and migration shocks; (iii) a decreasing replacement
rate i
t after 2005, as a consequence of the 1993 and 2003 pension reforms. We simulate the
model under the assumption that the year 1900 was a steady state. After 2100, all exogenous
variables keep the same value and the economy progressively converges to a new, ﬁnal steady
state. The period of interest is the transition taking place during the 21st century (2000-2100).
Values simulated for that sub-period are unlikely to be aﬀected by the initial conditions (1900
values).
Main Results
Figure 3 shows the change in some key variables in the base scenario (solid line). Disregard tem-
porarily the dotted line. Population aging implies increased savings and capital accumulation
(not shown in the ﬁgure). Because of diminishing returns, the interest rate decreases. Capital
accumulation also leads to a substantial increase in average labor productivity and wages, and
to an increase in the aggregate employment rate (about 6.4 percentage points). This higher
19Figure 3: The base scenario in frictional (solid line) and perfectly competitive (dotted line)
economies
employment rate comes from both a decrease in unemployment for young and mature workers
(25-54) and from an increase in the participation rate of elderly workers (55-64). These eﬀects
are related to capital accumulation and lower interest rates, which increase proﬁtability and
the number of job openings. They imply a higher optimal average retirement age (less early-
retirement), in an unchanged institutional environment. At given replacement rate, the higher
participation rate of elderly workers is due mainly to the increased probability of having a job
(see Equation (12)), which we can interpret as a lower “discouragement” eﬀect.
The estimated cost of public pensions (including early-retirement beneﬁts, and measured in
% of GDP) follows quite closely the projected values for France given in EC (2009), for the
period 2000-2060, under the assumption of an (approximately) 5 percentage points (exogenous)
increase in the aggregate employment rate. Thanks to the pension reforms decided in 1993-
20Figure 4: Contributions of fertility and migration shocks to the cost of public pensions (changes
in % of GDP)
2003, the increase in public pension costs over the period 2000-2060 is no more than 1-1.5
percentage point (instead of 7 percentage points in a simulation without pension reform). We
ﬁnd however that, after 2070, the continuing aging of the population may lead to additional
and substantial increases in the cost of public pensions.
The Contribution of Fertility and Migration Shocks
The cost of a given public pensions scheme in percent of GDP depends both on the expected
increases in longevity and the size of the migration and fertility shocks. To separate these
two eﬀects, we simulated the model again with all fertility and migration variables set at their
2100 values. The results are summarized in Figure 4, which indicates by how much the cost of
public pensions is changed by current and past fertility and migration shocks. During the ﬁrst
two decades, the eﬀect is strongly negative. This is the continuation of the baby boom eﬀect,
which maintains the dependency ratio at low levels. After 2025, the eﬀect becomes positive:
baby-boomers retire, and the dependency ratio remains above normal for about ﬁve periods.
After 2060, the eﬀect of fertility and migration shocks becomes negligible, ie, the increase in
the cost of public pensions after 2060 (see Figure 3) is solely driven by longevity eﬀects.
4.2 Competitive vs Frictional Labor Markets
Increased longevity changes the savings behavior of households and pushes the equilibrium
interest rate downwards. Firms use more capital, which pushes labor productivity and la-
bor demand upwards. The ﬁnal impact on employment depends on the working of the labor
market. In models with search frictions, labor demand changes may aﬀect the equilibrium
21(un-)employment rate. To evaluate the quantitative importance of such adjustments along the
extensive margin, we simulate the equilibrium with a frictionless labor market (Deﬁnition 2).
The participation decision of elderly workers remains endogenous and determined in exactly
the same fashion as before (see Equation (12) for workers aged 60-64), where the employment
probability for participating workers is now equal to one (7;t+7 = 1).
The comparison between the two economies is summarized in Figure 3. Values for the perfectly
competitive economy are represented by a dotted line. In the competitive setup, employment
rate changes can only arise from changes in the participation rate of elderly workers. Because
there is no unemployment risk and the market wage is higher, there is little early-retirement in
the competitive economy, although the generosity of the early-retirement scheme is the same
as in the frictional labor market economy. Despite increased labor productivity and wages,
the participation rate of elderly workers thus barely changes and has a negligible impact on
the aggregate employment rate. The comparison with the frictional labor market economy
is striking. In the frictional market, the increased labor demand leads to higher employment
probabilities for all age groups. A higher employment probability has a signiﬁcant impact on
the participation of elderly workers. Overall, the employment rate increases signiﬁcantly, and
stimulates further capital accumulation and investment. Altogether, the aggregate employment
rate increases by more than 6%.
These diﬀerences explain why the two economies react diﬀerently to the pension reforms and the
ensuing decrease in compensation rates. The cost of public pensions is initially smaller in the
competitive economy (because there is less early-retirement). In the next 30 years, it increases
by 2.7 percentage points and becomes larger than in the frictional economy (where the increase
is 1.3 percentage points). This diﬀerence reﬂects the diﬀerent impact of pension reforms on
employment rates, and the failure of the competitive model to account for adjustments along
the extensive margin.10
4.3 Policy Scenarios
We focus on two policy scenarios and compare their implications in the frictional and the
competitive economies. The ﬁrst scenario is a complete elimination of all early-retirement
payments after 2000. The second is a shift to a fully-funded system, announced in 2005 and
taking place in 2015. These two scenarios are admittedly extreme ones. They facilitate the
10The comparison between the competitive and the frictional economies does not change much if we keep
the activity rates of older workers ﬁxed at their 2000 values. Employment rates then change only as a result
of unemployment rate changes. In that scenario, the increase in pension costs between 2000 and 2035 is 1.11
percentage points larger in the competitive economy than in the frictional economy.
22Figure 5: The consequences of eliminating early-retirement beneﬁts after 2000, in the frictional
(solid line) and the competitive (dotted line) economy
comparisons between the two economies (frictional and competitive) and the interpretation of
the mechanisms at work.
Early-retirement reform
The consequences of the elimination of all early-retirement beneﬁts are illustrated in Figure 5.
This labor market policy change stimulates the participation of elderly workers, both in the
frictional and in the competitive economy. All eﬀects are qualitatively similar, but of a totally
diﬀerent magnitude, and much stronger in the frictional economy. In the competitive economy,
because there is no unemployment and the equilibrium wage is higher, the initial participation
rate is already high, and increases by 10 percentage points (from 85 to 95% at the time of
the shock), compared to 25 percentage points (from 68 to 93%) in the frictional economy.
23The induced impact eﬀects on employment, capital productivity (the interest rate), wages and
consumption (both decline at impact) are thus much more pronounced in the frictional economy.
There is also (at impact) an increase in the unemployment rate of younger workers. Eventually,
the unemployment rate returns to its initial value, but employment, wages and output increase
more in the frictional economy. The cost of public pensions (in % of GDP) decreases in the long
run by 1.5 percentage points in the frictional economy (1 percentage point in the competitive
economy). Short run eﬀects are larger, because the activity rates of older workers also react in
the longer run to changes in the unemployment rate and other variables engineered by capital
accumulation and the falling interest rate.
Shift from a PAYG to a FF Pension Scheme
Figure 6 illustrates the eﬀects of announcing in 2005 that a shift to a purely fully-funded
system will take place in 2015. We ﬁrst consider the frictional economy. At impact, aggregate
consumption falls, and savings and capital accumulation rise, which leads (with a one-period lag)
to a lower interest rate. The accumulation of capital and its positive eﬀect on labor productivity
stimulates labor demand and job creation (the unemployment rate starts falling) as well as
wage growth. The activity rate of elderly workers increases, by 12 percentage points at impact
(when consumption has fallen) and 5 percentage points in the long run (when consumption has
increased). The equilibrium unemployment rate is about 2.5 percentage points lower in the
long run, and implies a substantially larger output (and consumption) level (not shown in the
ﬁgure).
In the competitive economy, the unemployment rate cannot vary; the participation rate of el-
derly workers increases by 3 percentage points. Aggregate employment barely changes. Capital
accumulation leads to a larger output level, but this eﬀect is not reinforced by job creation, as
in the frictional economy.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis: International Capital Flows
The objective of this section is to check to what extent our results might depend on speciﬁc
assumptions. We repeated the previous simulation experiments for diﬀerent values of a few key
parameters: the subjective rate of time preference ( = 1 instead of 0.99), bargaining power
( = 0:70 instead of 0.50), concavity of leisure utility ( = 0:90 or more, instead of 0.80). Such
changes did not alter our main conclusions and are not reproduced here.11 Instead we focus on
the role of international capital ﬂows and their interactions with labor market imperfections.
11As discussed above, assuming linear preferences in leisure ( = 0) would imply an inﬁnitely large Frisch
elasticity and unrealistically large swings in participation rates.
24Figure 6: The consequences of announcing in 2005 a shift to a fully-funded system in 2015, in
the frictional (solid line) and the competitive (dotted line) economy
We do so by contrasting the closed economy scenario with the small open economy one. In the
latter, the interest rate is exogenous. Most actual economies are in between these two extremes.
Figure 7 shows the development of the key variables already considered in the base scenario
(see Figure 3) and compares them to the values obtained with the small open economy model.
In both the closed and the small open economy, population aging implies increased savings and
asset accumulation. In the small open economy, agents can borrow or lend freely from the rest
of the world, at given interest rate, assumed to remain constant. In the closed economy, agents
can only save by accumulating domestic capital; because of diminishing returns, the interest
rate decreases. This diﬀerence in interest rates explains all the other diﬀerences. With constant
returns to savings in the small open economy, per capita consumption remains almost constant
during the demographic transition, while it substantially decreases in the closed economy. In
the closed economy, domestic capital accumulation leads to a substantial increase in average
25Figure 7: Comparing the closed (solid line) and the small open economy (dotted line) scenarios
labor productivity (hence in gross wages), and also an increase in aggregate employment. This
higher employment level comes from both a decrease in the unemployment rate of young and
mature workers (25-54) and from an increase in the participation rate of elderly workers (55-
64). These eﬀects are related to capital accumulation and lower interest rates, which increase
proﬁtability and the number of job openings. These changes imply a higher optimal average
retirement age (less early-retirement), in an unchanged institutional environment. These eﬀects
are non-existent in the small open economy with ﬁxed interest rates. This contrast has large
implications for the cost of public pensions. In the small open economy, population aging
implies a 2 percentage point increase in the cost of public pensions between 2000 and 2060,
compared to 0.5% in the closed economy. It is worth stressing that pension costs (in % of GDP)
evolve in similar ways in the small open economy with frictions and in the closed economy with
perfect competition. This is because in both cases the employment level does not vary much
and does not amplify the eﬀects of policy changes.
26Both Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) and Attanasio et al. (2007) have already stressed the role of
international capital ﬂows in determining how an economy will react to population aging. We
obtain a similar conclusion and emphasize that in economies with a frictional labor market,
changes in the equilibrium unemployment rate provide an additional mechanism by which
international capital ﬂows may aﬀect the adjustment process and the future cost of public
pensions (as a % of GDP). With frictional labor markets, even the ﬁscal variables are aﬀected
by capital ﬂows.
5 Conclusions
We have introduced labor frictions and early-retirement decisions into an otherwise standard
OLG setup with population aging. In this setup, we show that population aging reduces the
equilibrium unemployment rate, through its eﬀect on capital accumulation, the interest rate
and job openings. We have also shown that these eﬀects can be substantially reinforced by
endogenous participation rate changes (lower early-retirement rates).
Introducing frictions also changes the quantitative eﬀects of policy changes (for instance lower
retirement beneﬁts), again via the eﬀect of these policies on savings, the interest rate and
equilibrium unemployment.
By contrasting the results obtained in the case of a small open economy with those of a closed
economy, we have illustrated the importance of capital ﬂows. When the interest rate is ex-
ogenously determined on world ﬁnancial markets, population aging and pension reforms have
similar eﬀects on employment rates and the ﬁscal variables (public pension costs), although the
implications for per capita consumption and the saving rate may be quite diﬀerent.
In a two-country model, the interest rate would again be endogenous, and the new transmission
mechanisms introduced by labor market frictions would work in much the same way as in the
closed economy model, at least qualitatively. Future research should focus on interest rate
determination and the impact of asymmetric labor market institutions in a multi-country setup.
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Appendix: The Household Optimization Problem
With initial and ﬁnal ﬁnancial wealth equal to zero (no bequests), the household’s intertemporal
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The discount factor Rt;t+a is deﬁned by Rt;t = 1 and Rt;t+j = a
j=1 Rt+j for j  1.
The values of ca;t+a, 6;t+6 and 7;t+7 maximizing the household objective function (10) subject
to (5) and (9) and the intertemporal budget constraint (28) can thus be obtained from the
















































12It is clear from Equation (28) that consumption taxes have the same eﬀect as income taxes.
30where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the intertemporal budget constraint. The
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The other two optimality conditions are speciﬁc to this model and determine the activity rate
of older workers. After substitution and rearrangement, and with the assumption that u(ca;t+a)












































































The economic interpretation of these optimality conditions becomes easier if we note that the

































and similarly for the other optimality condition.
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